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Partial Revocation of the Caribbean Basin Trade
Partnership Act: An Analysis of Hemispheric Injuries
and Domestic Benefits
Hale E. Sheppard, Esq. *
Introduction
When it comes to international trade, there is at least one
immutable truism: those who are hurt by a trade bill or'existing
trade program often complain loudly and incessantly, while those
who benefit tend to remain silent, unaware of the advantages
potentially or actually conferred to them.1 A classic example of
this phenomenon is currently underway on Capitol Hill, where the
U.S. textile industry, a legendarily boisterous and influential
group, is attempting to pressure U.S. lawmakers into partially
revoking the trade preferences granted to several dozen Latin
American nations under the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership
Act (CBTPA).2
The predecessor to the CBTPA was originally introduced in
the early 1980s, and was designed primarily to diversify and
strengthen the troubled Caribbean economies by increasing
exports, reducing the incidences of drug trafficking, and
diminishing illegal immigration to the United States.' The
Hale E. Sheppard (B.S. Journalism, with distinction; M.A. Latin
American Studies, with honors; J.D. - University of Kansas; Magister (LL.M.
equivalent) in International Law, with highest distinction - University of
Chile) is an attorney in Washington, D.C., working primarily in the areas of
trade regulation, customs, export controls, and international transactions.
Eternally grateful for their kindness, unconditional generosity, and inspiration to
embrace the complexities of U.S.-Latin America relations, Mr. Sheppard
dedicates this article to Ann and Sonny Johnston.
I See John Burgess & Matthew Vita, House Vote for Textile Trade Ends Long
Fight, WASH. POST, May 5, 2000, at El
2 Id.
3 OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 4TH REPORT TO CONG. ON THE
OPERATION OF THE CARIBBEAN BASIN ECONOMIC RECOVERY ACT, at 15 (Dec. 31, 2001)
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CBTPA was introduced in 2000 to expand trade preferences to
U.S. imports of, among other products, certain textile and apparel
goods from the Caribbean region, to counteract the unintentional
trade advantages over the Caribbean nations that Mexico received
in 1994 as a result of the enactment of the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA).4
Although the U.S. textile industry has fervently opposed this
expansion from the outset, previous efforts to repeal the CBTPA
have failed.5 However, harnessing all of its political leverage and
capitalizing on the Bush Administration's seeming desperation to
obtain trade promotion authority, it now appears that the domestic
textile industry has achieved a strategic victory: trade preferences
to the Caribbean nations will likely undergo partial revocation in
2002 pursuant to a recent agreement between political leaders in
the U.S. House of Representatives and certain lawmakers
representing states whose economies are heavily dependent on
textile production.6  While this legislative modification may
temporarily benefit the 440,000 American textile jobs still in
existence today, a broader analysis reveals that this ephemeral
reprieve enjoyed by a relatively small portion of the domestic
workforce will generate enormous and perhaps unforeseen
problems, both for the United States and Latin America.7
Predicated on this premise, this article is organized in the
following manner: the first section describes the evolution and
most important provisions of the CBTPA; the second section
provides a chronological overview of the activities (legislative and
otherwise) related to the proposed partial revocation of trade
preferences currently granted to the Caribbean nations under the
[hereinafter U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 4TH REPORT].
4 U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, THE IMPACT OF THE CARIBBEAN BASIN ECON.
RECOVERY ACT, 15TH REPORT, Publication No. 3447, at 43 (Sept. 2001) [hereinafter U.S.
INT'L TRADE COMM'N, 15TH REPORT].
5 See generally US. Dyers Lose Ground on CBI, WOMEN'S WEAR DAILY, May 29,
2001, at A7.
6 See generally Rossella Brevetti, House Passes TPA measure by One Vote after
GOP Sways Vote with Textile Promise, 18 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 49 (Dec. 13,
2001).
7 See Kristi Ellis, U.S. Mills Threatened As Quotas Are Lifted, WOMEN'S WEAR
DAILY, Jan. 29, 2002, at 2 (indicating that the current U.S. textile industry encompasses
approximately 440,000 jobs).
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CBTPA; in the third section, the positive results rendered by the
CBTPA thus far are set forth, as well as the inevitable negative
ramifications that retracting trade preferences to the Caribbean
nations will have on the Western Hemisphere in its entirety.
Based on these arguments, while acknowledging the fact that the
U.S. textile industry may indeed be in dire straits, this article
concludes that altering the CBTPA at this juncture to temporarily
protect a rather limited amount of domestic positions constitutes
misguided trade policy for the United States and a serious threat to
many Latin American nations.
I. Evolution of the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act
Enacted in August 1983, the Caribbean Basin Economic
Recovery Act (CBERA) is a preferential trade program whereby
the United States allows certain imports from Caribbean nations to
enter the U.S. market without paying any customs duties.8 In
short, this program was designed to diversify and strengthen the
Caribbean economies by increasing exports and expanding
investment (foreign and domestic) in nontraditional sectors.
Originally scheduled to expire in September 1995, the CBERA
was modestly enhanced in 1990 and made permanent. 9 The
impact of the CBERA on both the Caribbean nations and the
United States during the initial years of the program was minimal,
but positive."
With regard to U.S. imports of apparel throughout the 1980s,
the United States introduced several trade initiatives that
encouraged U.S. apparel producers to establish production-sharing
arrangements with businesses located in developing areas such as
the Caribbean. 1  For instance, under Chapter 98 of the
Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States, Caribbean
apparel exports received a partial duty exemption such that duties
8 Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act was enacted August 5, 1983, as part of
Public Law 98-67, Title II (codified at 19 U.S.C. §2701 (2001)), and became effective on
January 1, 1984, pursuant to Presidential Proclamation 5133.
9 Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Expansion Act of 1990 was enacted on
August 20, 1990, as part of the Customs and Trade Act of 1990, Public Law 101-382,
Title II.
10 U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, 15TH REPORT, supra note 4.
11 Id.
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were charged only on the value added to the goods abroad.1 2 In
other words, in addition to enjoying virtually unlimited access to
the U.S. market in terms of quantity, Caribbean apparel exporters
were required to pay duties only on the difference between the
value of the components (i.e., the fabric and other inputs shipped
from the United States) and the apparel (i.e., the finished
product). "
However, when NAFTA was promulgated in 1994, apparel
produced in Mexico with U.S. components entered the United
States completely duty-free. 4  Consequently, the U.S. gave
Mexico a significant amount of production-sharing arrangements
and foreign investment, thus rendering the CBERA less beneficial
to the Caribbean nations. 5
On May 18, 2000, President Bill Clinton rectified the situation
when he signed the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act
(CBTPA), which provides NAFTA-parity to the Caribbean
nations.' 6  With regard to apparel goods assembled in the
Caribbean, the CBTPA significantly expanded the preferential
treatment previously granted under the CBERA by conferring
duty-free and quota-free access to the U.S. market for apparel
goods made entirely of U.S. components."7 In addition to apparel,
the CBTPA grants NAFTA-equivalent duty preferences for certain
goods that were previously excluded under the CBERA, including
footwear, canned tuna, petroleum products, watches and watch
parts. 18
In order to qualify for such preferential duty treatment, each
12 Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States, Section 9802.00.80.
13 Id.
14 U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, 15TH REPORT, supra note 4.
15 Id.
16 Trade and Development Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-200, 114 Stat. 251 (2000).
The CBTPA took effect in October 2000 after the U.S. Customs Service issued its
interim regulations implementing the law. See United States-Caribbean Basin Trade
Partnership Act and Caribbean Basin Initiative, 65 Fed. Reg. 59,658, 59,650, 59,668
(Oct. 5, 2000) [hereinafter Caribbean Basin Initiative].
17 Trade and Development Act § 211 (granting preferential treatment to certain knit
apparel made in the Caribbean from fabrics formed in the Caribbean, provided that U.S.
yams are utilized to make the fabric, and to apparel made from fabrics that are deemed to
be in "short supply" in the United States).
18 Id.
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Caribbean nation must meet various "designation criteria." For
instance, a country (i) cannot be communist; (ii) may not take
measures that have the effect of nationalizing, expropriating, or
seizing property owned by U.S. citizens or companies without
prompt and adequate compensation; (iii) must act in good faith in
recognizing and enforcing arbitral awards in favor of U.S. citizens
or companies; (iv) must provide effective protection of intellectual
property rights; and (v) must take steps to grant internationally
recognized worker rights. 9 In addition to satisfying these criteria,
eligibility under the CBTPA requires that each country implement,
or make substantial progress towards implementing, certain
customs procedures based on those contained in NAFTA.2°
Currently, fourteen of the twenty-four Caribbean nations satisfy
this requirement (Barbados, Belize, Costa Rica, Dominican
Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras,
Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, Saint Lucia, and Trinidad and
Tobago) and thus enjoy those benefits provided by the CBPTA.2'
As with the CBERA, studies conducted by the Office of the
U.S. Trade Representative indicate that while the impact of the
CBTPA has been limited but positive thus far, substantial benefits
for both the Caribbean nations and the United States are
anticipated soon, since, despite various problems with their
implementing regulations, the new provisions have been "used
extensively" during their first few months of existence.22
II. The Proposed Revocation of Benefits Under the CBTPA
On October 5, 2000, shortly after the enactment of the
CBTPA, controversy erupted over the implementing regulations
issued by the U.S. Customs Service. For example, section 211 of
the CBTPA dictates that duty-free treatment shall be granted to
apparel assembled in the Caribbean from fabrics that are "wholly
formed in the United States. 23 In its interim regulations, the U.S.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Kristi Ellis, Mills Threatened as Quotas are Lifted, WOMEN'S WEAR DAILY, Jan.
29, 2002, at 2.
22 U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 4TH REPORT, supra note 3.
23 Trade and Development Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-200, § 211,114 Stat. 251
(2000).
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Customs Service determined that the phrase "wholly formed" did
not require the fabric to be dyed and finished in the United States
in order to qualify for preferential treatment.z4
Arguing that this interpretation contradicts the "intent" of
Congress when passing the CBTPA, Senator Jesse Helms (R-
N.C.), whose textile-dependent home state of North Carolina
would conceivably be hurt by such a determination, blocked
confirmation of four high-level U.S. Treasury Department
nominees in June 200 1.25 In addition to impeding the confirmation
of the proposed Treasury officials, Senator Helms enlisted other
techniques such as attempting to place the dyeing-and-finishing
language into a tax reduction bill as a last-minute rider.26 Much to
Senator Helms's chagrin, neither of these legislative maneuvers
proved successful, and the four Treasury officers were confirmed
in August 2001.27
Notwithstanding this initial defeat, the dyeing-and-finishing
controversy surfaced yet again in late 2001 amid a seemingly
unrelated issue. On December 6, 2001, the U.S. House of
Representatives approved a bill, S. 3005, granting the President
trade promotion authority (TPA) by a one-vote margin of 215 in
favor, to 214 opposed.28
Formerly known as "fast track authority," TPA allows
Congress to participate in trade policy by setting formal guidelines
according to which the President (vis-A-vis the U.S. Trade
Representative) must conduct trade negotiations.2 9 However, once
TPA is granted and a potential trade pact is brokered within the
congressional framework, lawmakers may only approve or reject a
24 Caribbean Basin Initiative, supra note 16.
25 Helms Still Blocks Treasury Nominees Because of Customs' Textile Rules for
CBI, 18 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 24, 937-38 (June 14, 2001); see also Rossella
Brevetti, Possible Compromise on CB1/A GOA Textile Rules Floated by Industry Groups,
18 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 34, 1321-22 (Aug. 23, 2001); Joanna Ramey, Flare-Up
in Helms's Dyeing Fracas, WOMEN'S WEAR DAILY, July 31, 2001, at 7.
26 U.S. Dyers Lose Ground on CBI, WOMEN'S WEAR DAILY, May 29, 2001, at 7.
27 R.G. Edmenson, A Future in Textiles? Dyeing and Finishing Issue Threatens
Evolution of Caribbean Apparel Industry, JOURNAL OF COMMERCE, Aug. 20, 2001, at 1;
see also Dave Boyer, Senator Abandons His Hold on Nominees; Helms Takes Hint by
White House, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2001, at A6.
28 Brevetti, supra note 6, at 1977.
29 Id.
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trade bill in its entirety, without making modifications.3 ° In this
manner, U.S. trade negotiators possess the requisite credibility to
finalize trade agreements because potential trading partners are
assured that the commitments made in good faith on behalf of the
United States during negotiations will not later be excessively
delayed, conditioned or fundamentally altered by Congress.31
Approval of TPA was extremely controversial because the
necessary votes were obtained only after Republican leaders
promised lawmakers representing states with textile-dependent
economies (the Textile Caucus) that they would "correct" existing
and future trade bills to address concerns regarding textiles.32
Specifically, the written pledge stated that trade-related bills such
as the CBTPA would be amended to require that all fabrics
undergo dyeing and finishing operations in the United States in
order to qualify for duty-free treatment (the Dye-and-Finish
Pledge).33
Because TPA is key to its trade agenda, the Bush
Administration has continually supported the Dye-and-Finish
Pledge.34 As evidence thereof, in January 2002, the U.S. Secretary
of Commerce, Donald Evans, announced that an interagency
textile task force had been created to adhere to the Dye-and-Finish
30 Id.
31 John H. Jackson et al., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RELATIONS 81-87 (4th ed., West Group 2002) (1977).
32 Brevetti, supra note 6, at 1977. The Dye-And-Finish Pledge was formalized in a
letter signed by Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert (R-Ill.), House Majority Leader
Richard Armey (R-Tex.), and House Majority Whip Tom DeLay (R-Tex.), which said
[W]e pledge to bring no future bills with trade provisions to the
House floor until the Trade and Development Act [that contains the
CBTPA] is corrected to require that U.S. knit and woven fabrics be
required to undergo all dyeing, finishing and printing procedures in
the United States in order to qualify for the benefits.
Id.
33 Id.
34 Chris Rugaber, Bush Pledges Support for Textile Promises Made to Win TPA
Passage, 18 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 50, 2017-18 (Dec. 20, 2001). Asked if
President Bush had second thoughts about the promises made (i.e., the Dye-and-Finish
Pledge ) to secure the passage of TPA, the White House Press Secretary answered in the
negative, claiming that Congress "did the right thing, for the right policy reasons, to
promote American trade, which helps all workers." Id.
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Pledge.35 Leaving no room for misinterpretation regarding the
Bush Administration's support for this political maneuver,
Secretary Evans stated that
[b]oth the President and I are committed to doing what it takes
to ensure that this industry can compete in world markets. This
is exactly what textile-state representatives asked us in advance
of the vote [for TPA] this past December, and this
Administration will work to ensure that we accomplish this
goal.36
In addition to these unequivocal statements, fulfillment of the
Dye-and-Finish Pledge is evidenced by the meetings of a recently
formed, ad hoc, textile taskforce, which have been attended by
representatives from the U.S. Departments of Commerce, Labor,
Treasury, State, and Justice.37
Opponents of the Dye-and-Finish Pledge initially hoped to find
a middle ground on the issue, 38 but members of the Textile Caucus
have been notably inflexible.39 Just as Senator Helms argued in
early 2001, certain lawmakers remain convinced that the CBTPA
regulations were drafted too liberally in the first place, and they
insist on full implementation of the Dye-and-Finish Pledge: "This
is not an area that [leaves] any place to compromise."° In fact,
many members of the Textile Caucus have demanded that
Congress implement the Dye-and-Finish Pledge immediately in
order to protect their credibility by demonstrating to their
constituents that they received legitimate commitments in
35 Rossella Brevetti, Commerce Secretary Announces Working Group on Textiles
in Wake of TPA, 19 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 5, 176 (Jan. 31, 2002).
36 Id.; see also Rossella Brevetti, ATM Calls on Congress and White House to
Help Industry, 19 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 2 (Jan. 10, 2002). Predictably, the
American Textile Manufacturers Institute also urged the Bush Administration to uphold
its end of the Dye-and-Finish Pledge, especially in light of the alleged "crisis" in the U.S.
textile industry. Id.
37 Rossella Brevetti, Textile Task Force Holds Organizational Meeting, 19 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 6, 228-29 (Feb. 2, 2002).
38 Thomas Floats K[nit- Woven Split as Solution to Dyeing and Finishing, 20 INSIDE
U.S. TRADE 9 (Mar. 1, 2002).
39 See id. at 2.
40 Rossella Brevetti, Hayes Says He Will Not Compromise on Dyeing and Finishing
Promise, 19 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 13, 544 (Mar. 28, 2002); see also Thomas
Floats Knit-Woven Split as Solution to Dyeing and Finishing, supra note 38, at 1.
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exchange for their TPA votes.41 For its part, even though the Bush
Administration is unable to force Congress to amend the CBTPA
(expeditiously or otherwise) to reflect the Dye-and-Finish Pledge,
it has assured the Textile Caucus that it will take all conceivable
measures to fulfill its obligation and accept any recriminations
arising therefrom.42 In a recent announcement by Commerce
Secretary Evans about the intentions of the Bush Administration,
he reaffirmed that "[w]e will keep our word and we don't mind
being held accountable. 43
III.Arguments in Favor of Preserving the CBTPA
Examined below are the positive results rendered by the
CBTPA thus far, as well as the negative repercussions that
retracting trade preferences to the Caribbean nations will have on
the Western Hemisphere in its entirety.
A. Facilitates the Free Trade Area of the Americas
The Bush Administration has identified the negotiation and
completion of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) by
2005 as one of its primary goals on the international trade
agenda.44 The FTAA, in short, will be a free trade zone
encompassing the thirty-four democratic nations of the Western
Hemisphere.45 In terms of positive effects of the FTAA on Latin
America, the Deputy U.S. Trade Representative explains that this
proposed trade pact will benefit this region by (i) increasing access
to foreign markets, which will permit economic diversification;
(ii) promoting transparency, competition and impartial regulation
of sectors such as telecommunications, insurance and financial
services; (iii) fostering foreign investment (both direct and
41 Hastert Tells Textile Caucus Leadership Will Keep Fast-Track Promises, 20
INSIDE U.S. TRADE 7, 15 (Feb. 15, 2002).
42 Brevetti, supra note 40.
43 Id.
44 Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, The President's 2001 International
Trade Agenda, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/05/20010511.html
(May 10, 2001) [hereinafter President's 2001 International Trade Agenda]; see also OFF.
OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., 2001 TRADE POLICY AGENDA AND 2000 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT OF THE U.S. ON THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM, at 3, 110, at
http://www.ustr.gov/reports/2002.html.
45 President's 2001 International Trade Agenda, supra note 44.
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indirect) by creating the world's largest trade area composed of
some 800 million people; and (iv) reinforcing the values of
openness, accountability, democracy and rule-of-law that are
critical to any real effort to combat narco-trafficking.46
Partial revocation of the trade preferences granted under the
CBTPA will undermine the FTAA process in two main ways.
First, to be capable of surviving the fierce inter-hemispheric
competition that will emerge when the free trade zone is instituted
in 2005, all of the Latin American economies, including those in
the Caribbean, must first be diversified and strengthened.47
Paramount to the fortification of the Caribbean economies is the
establishment of production-sharing arrangements involving
apparel and the receipt of foreign investment, both of which will
decline if the CBTPA preferences are partially revoked.48 In other
words, if the Dye-and-Finish Pledge is implemented, the ability of
the CBTPA to meet its purpose of serving as a provisional
"bridge" to a successful FTAA will be severely weakened.
Second, partial retraction of preferences under the CBTPA
may make many Latin American nations unwilling to continue
participating in the FTAA process, thereby making TPA
essentially ineffectual. After all, as a procedural mechanism, TPA
theoretically allows the President to expedite the negotiation and
46 Deputy United States Trade Representative, Ambassador Peter Allgeier,
Testimony on Renewal of the Andean Trade Preference Act Before the Senate Finance
Committee, Subcommittee on International Trade, at http://www.ustr.gov/speech-
test/assistant/2001-08-03 Allgeier.pdf (Aug. 3, 2001).
47 U.S. Trade Representative, Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky, The Turning
Point: The Caribbean Basin Initiative and the Free Trade Area of the Americas in 2000,
Speech Before the Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, DC, at
http://www.ustr.gov/speech-test/barshefsky/barshefsky_98.pdf (Sept. 11, 2000).
48 Trade and Development Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-200, §§ 202(b)(2),
21 1(b)(5)(D), 114 Stat. 251 (2000). This second section provides that the CBTPA will
expire on September 30, 2008, unless the FTAA or a comparable free trade agreement
between the United States and the Caribbean nations enters into force prior to that date.
Id. at § 211 (b)(5)(D). See also Rossella Brevetti, Rep. Crane Signals Readiness to
Advance Andean Renewal Measure, 18 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 32, 1268 (Aug. 9,
2001) (discussing the production-sharing arrangements contained in the Andean Trade
Preference Act and the importance of its goodwill to FTAA success); Gary G. Yerkey,
U.S. Wants to Extend Andean Trade Law to 2005 and Extend Product Coverage, 18 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 9, 751 (May 10, 2001) (discussing the production-sharing
arrangements contained in the Andean Trade Preference Act).
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passage of trade pacts.49 However, if potential trade partners lack
the requisite trust or willingness to effectuate trade deals with the
United States, or if a sufficient amount of disgruntled congressmen
unify to bar certain trade initiatives in spite of TPA, then this tool
will have little practical use.5°
The detrimental impact of the Dye-and-Finish Pledge on future
FTAA negotiations is evident in both the United States and Latin
America. For example, in the United States, upon the issuance of
the Dye-and-Finish Pledge, Congressman Charles Rangel (D-
N.C.) warned that reneging on concessions granted to the
Caribbean nations under the CBTPA would be interpreted by these
nations as an utter betrayal." Congressman Rangel argues, in
particular, that "[i]t comes at the expense of hundreds of thousands
of Caribbean workers, as well as their governments, who trust[]
that when the United States gives its word in trade matters, that
word means something. 52 He warns, moreover, that the United
States "will have no credibility in international trade negotiations"
if it demonstrates that in order to pass TPA it is willing to undo
existing trade commitments.53
In addition to politicians, various commentators have
emphasized the potential negative effects caused by the Dye-and-
Finish Pledge. One respected columnist, for example, classified it
as a "shaky victory on trade" since TPA was obtained in a manner
that will likely make future trade pacts (like the FTAA) "hard to
sell."54 Likewise, other trade-policy analysts argue that the TPA
49 See Rossella Brevetti & Fawn H. Johnson, Baucus Sees TPA Trade Package
Moving to Senate Floor in March, 19 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 7, 268 (Feb. 14, 2002).
50 See id. (emphasizing that TPA alone is meaningless unless future trade
agreements like the FTAA can actually be facilitated by using this tool.) Congressmen
have explained that "[i]f the Bush Administration wants to pass trade acts, it needs to
build a record of trust."
51 Press Release, Office of Representative Charles B. Rangel, Rep. Rangel Blasts
Republican Leaders' Reported Commitment to Undo Past Trade Bill in Order to Pass
Fast Track Bill by One Vote, at http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/nyl5_rangel/
pr070302immigration.html (Dec. 6, 2001).
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 David S. Broder, A Shaky Victory on Trade, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 2001, at A35;
see also Christopher Farrell, Globalism, the Cure for War and Misery, Bus. WK. ONLINE
(Dec. 14, 2001) (classifying passing the TPA vote in exchange for increasing
protectionist barriers against the textile makers in Africa as "a step in the wrong
2002]
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vote should have demonstrated that the United States is prepared
to deal on trade, yet it left many international observers "skeptical
about the reliability of American promises."55 According to other
ideologues, several Latin American nations have manifested
considerable reluctance to proceed with FTAA negotiations due
primarily to the "do what I say not what I do" U.S. trade
negotiating posture toward the region and the recent incidents of
U.S. protectionism involving steel, lumber and textiles. 6 Critics
warn that despite official pronouncements to the contrary, several
Latin American nations have little enthusiasm for further trade
liberalization and that "U.S. trade hypocrisy gives the foot
draggers all the excuse they need."57
In terms of the negativity toward the FTAA in Latin America,
Brazil has been increasingly vocal about its reluctance to continue
the negotiating process. For instance, after the TPA bill - passed
in the U.S. House of Representatives in December 2001 -
restricted the ability of the U.S. President to reduce tariffs on
certain items without congressional approval, the Brazilian
President Fernando Henrique Cardoso warned that if TPA is not
modified, it "will doom any prospects for approval of the [FTAA]
by Brazil. 5 8 Brazil has also manifested its anger about President
Bush's recent decision to impose tariffs on U.S. steel imports.59
direction"), at http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/dec2001/nf20011214
_3105.htm; see also Edward Gresser, Dark Victory: TPA Passage, CB1 Retreat, and the
Next Steps, PROGRESSIVE POL'Y INST. (Jan. 14, 2002) (claiming that the Dye-and-Finish
Pledge will dilute some of the strategic benefit of passing TPA, which is simply a
procedural mechanism used in trade negotiations), at http://www.ppionline.org/
ppi ci.cfm?contentid=250005&knlgArealD=108&subsecid=900010.
55 Lael Brainard, Textiles and Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2001, at A19.
56 Brink Lindsey, U.S. Protectionism Imperils Free Trade Talks with Latins, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 22, 2002, at A]5.
57 Id. (criticizing the Bush Administration's support of recent protectionist
measures such as the Dye-and-Finish Pledge, which may cause the FTAA negotiation
process, scheduled to begin in May 2002, to "go nowhere"). Pointing out the
inconsistency between the Bush Administration's constant rhetoric about free trade and
the recent trade measures designed to protect U.S. industries like steel, lumber and
textiles, this article warns that "[i]f the stumbling doesn't stop soon, the president's [sic]
big plan for hemispheric free trade is likely to fall flat on its face." Id.
58 Ed Taylor, Brazilian Officials Upset at House TPA Bill May Seek to End FTAA
Discussions, 18 INT'L TRADE REPORTER 50, 2041 (Dec. 20, 2001).
59 Steeling for a Fight, ECONOMIST, Mar. 23, 2002, at 36; see also Noam Scheiber,
Trading Places, THE NEW REPUBLIC ONLINE (Mar. 26, 2002) (noting that the thirty
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As one commentator explained, "[e]ven before George Bush
slapped tariffs of up to thirty percent on imported steel this month,
Brazil wondered if there was much prospect of a fair deal from the
proposed [FTAA]. Now, it has further reason for doubt."6 Citing
the strengthening of the Southern Cone Common Market
(MERCOSUR), in which Brazil holds a dominant position, some
Brazilian legislators have lobbied for simply withdrawing from
further hemispheric negotiations, as an attractive alternative to
proceeding with the FTAA process.6' Momentum for this position
is increased by the recent economic crisis in Argentina, which has
triggered many doubts about whether the Western Hemisphere is
prepared for true trade competition.6 z With Brazil's growing
aversion to the FTAA and the economic turmoil in Argentina that
calls into question the preparedness of Latin America for enhanced
trade liberalization, the Dye-and-Finish Pledge will undoubtedly
make the FTAA even less appealing.
B. Avoids Capital and Production Shifts to Mexico
As noted above, one of the explicit rationales for enacting the
CBTPA was to eliminate the competitive edge (in apparel
production and other sectors) that Mexico received when NAFTA
took effect in 1994.63 Since U.S. imports of apparel from Mexico
entered duty-free under NAFTA, while the Caribbean nations,
pursuant to Chapter 98 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the
percent tariffs imposed by the U.S. will cost Brazil $1 billion over the next three'years,
causing the Brazilian government to conclude that "America talks constantly about free
trade but when it come to practice, it is protectionist"), at http://www.tnr.corn
doc.mhtml?i=express&s=scheiber032602.
60 Steeling for a Fight, supra note 59.
61 Matthew Flynn, BRAZIL INCREASINGLY UNENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT U.S. FTAA
PROPOSALS: HAS BUSH'S "CENTURY OF THE AMERICAS" ALREADY COME AND GONE?
(Feb. 1, 2002) ("If the United States can pull out of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
because that doesn't suit its interests, why shouldn't we pull out of negotiations that are
not going to be of any benefit to us?"), at http://www.americaspolicy.org/
briefs/2002/body_0202brazil.html.
62 Finaly Lewis, A Stop in Mexico to Open Bush Latin America Trip, SAN DIEGO
UNION TRIBUNE, March 20, 2002, at A3; see also Joachim Bamrud, FTAA: What Now?
LATIN BUS. CHRON., at http://www.latinbusinesschronicle.com/reports/reports/ftaa.htm
(Jan. 14, 2002) (speculating that Argentina's new protectionist government could unify
with Brazil to decelerate or even derail FTAA negotiations).
63 U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, 15TH REPORT, supra note 4.
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United States, were forced to pay duties on the value added to
their apparel exports, a significant amount of capital and
production-sharing arrangements shifted to Mexico in the mid-
1990s. 64  As one representative of Jockey International, Inc.
explains, with the
elimination of tariffs under NAFTA and with the slightly easier
and cheaper transportation between Mexico and the United
States versus that between the Caribbean and the United States,
Mexico has a significant trade advantage. Competition from
Mexico caused many United States apparel companies to move
their investments and contracting relationships from [Caribbean]
countries to Mexico.
65
Thanks to the NAFTA-parity provided in the CBTPA, foreign
investment and production-sharing arrangements began to relocate
to the Caribbean after 2000.66 In particular, considerable funds
were directed towards constructing "full package" apparel
facilities wherein the entire production process (including
assembly, finishing, packaging and distribution) can be performed
in one single location in the Caribbean.67 If preferential treatment
under the CBTPA is partially revoked pursuant to the Dye-and-
Finish Pledge, the likely result will be a 1994 d6jA vu: investment
and production will shift to Mexico because intense price
64 See, e.g., Costa Rica Wants CBI Program To Be Enhanced, Rodriguez Says, 15
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 24, 1052 (1998); His Excellency Rend A. Le6n, Ambassador
to the U.S. from the Republic of El Salvador, Testimony on H.R. 984 before the
Subcommittee on Trade, the House Committee on Ways and Means, the "Caribbean and
Central American Relief and Economic Stabilization Act", at
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/trade/JO6cong/3-23-99/3-23leon.htm (Mar. 23, 1999)
[hereinafter Testimony on H.R. 984].
65 U.S. Relief Efforts in Response to Hurricane Mitch: Hearing Before the
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps, Narcotics and Terrorism,
Committee on Foreign Relations, 106th Cong. 3 (1999) (statement of Mark Jaeger, Vice-
President and Gen. Counsel, Jockey Int'l) [hereinafter U.S. Relief Efforts: Hearing]; see
also Testimony on H.R. 984, supra note 64, at 95-98. As expressed by Martin, NAFTA,
albeit unintentionally, has led to the diversion of existing and potential investment from
the Caribbean region to Mexico and Asia. Testimony on H.R. 984, supra note 64, at 95-
98. Without the "level playing field" provided by the CBTPA, warns Martin, "U.S.
companies already in the region, competitively disadvantaged by the elimination of
Mexican duty rates and quotas, will move new investment elsewhere and disinvest
existing manufacturing facilities." Id. at 98.
66 U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, 15TH REPORT, supra note 4.
67 Id.
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competition makes the apparel industry a "penny-pinching
business" in which "[d]eals have been lost over a nickel.
68
C. Prepares for the Onslaught of Asian Apparel in 2005
The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, under the World
Trade Organization (WTO), imposes quotas on U.S. apparel
imports from Asia until 2005.69 Thereafter, Caribbean apparel
producers must fully compete with their Asian rivals, who have
the advantages of lower labor costs and access to an abundance of
low-cost, high-quality fabrics.7" According to industry experts, the
relocation of U.S. apparel operations is inevitable due to the
relatively high wages in the United States within this labor-
intensive business.
The issue becomes, therefore, where to re-establish the
operations. While Asia does offer lower labor prices, collaborating
with companies in that region would not benefit apparel-related
industries in the United States Whatsoever, since Asian producers
tend not to utilize U.S. fabrics, cotton, or other inputs. Non-
utilization of U.S. inputs causes the elimination of domestic jobs.
As one industry representative explains, "a partnership that has
been in place since the mid-eighties with the [Caribbean] region
will serve U.S. interests of stability and growth and allow apparel
manufacturers to provide jobs in that region and maintain to the
extent feasible jobs in the United States."'
68 Andean Trade Preference Act: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Int'l Trade,
Senate Committee on Finance, 107th Cong. 12 (2001) (statement of Paul Arcia, Pres.,
A.R.C. Int'l) (explaining that this production-and-capital-shift phenomena is
characteristic of the apparel business in general) [hereinafter Andean Trade Preference
Act: Hearing]. Alluding to the shift to the Caribbean region from the Andean region after
the enactment of the CBTPA, this expert explains that the negative impact for the
Andean region was immediate: orders by major clients such as Target, Wal-Mart, Costco
and Fruit of the Loom were instantly canceled, thus forcing the company to lay off
approximately one-third of its workforce. Id. at 11-12. This shift was not, however, a
surprise to this executive who explained that the apparel industry "is a miserable penny-
pinching business. With the advent of the super-retailer and the consolidation of many
customers, cutting costs is a paramount objective. Deals have been lost over a nickel."
Id. at 12.
69 U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, 15TH REPORT, supra note 4.
70 Id.
71 U.S. Relief Efforts: Hearing, supra note 65, at 22 (testimony of Mark Jaeger,
Vice-Pres. And Gen. Counsel of Jockey Int'l); Testimony on H.R. 984, supra note 64, at
93-98 (statement of Larry K. Martin, Pres., Amer. Apparel Manufacturers, as presented
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In addition to preserving as many jobs in the United States as
possible, establishing production-sharing arrangements under the
CBTPA (i) helps eliminate poverty and drug trafficking in the
region through market-led economic growth; (ii) reduces the flow
of immigration-by-necessity by providing employment
opportunities in the region; (iii) fosters hemispheric stability; and
(iv) increases U.S. exports of fabrics and other components.72 At
the time of its implementation, other industry experts categorized
the CBTPA as "one of the last opportunities" for the Western
Hemisphere's textile and apparel industries to forge the alliances
necessary to survive under worldwide quota-free trade in 2005. 7"
Stating it even more bluntly, a former U.S. trade negotiator
warned that "[y]ou've got five years to get your act in gear. 74
Because of the uncertainty regarding the CBTPA regulations,
many U.S. companies were reluctant to invest in the Caribbean in
2000 and 2001. If the Dye-and-Finish Pledge passes, it is clear
that foreign investment in the Caribbean, especially in terms of the
"full package" facilities, will decrease. Accordingly, the
Caribbean nations will not be prepared to compete with the
dramatic increase of low-priced apparel from Asia in 2005, and
U.S. producers of cotton, fabrics and other inputs will suffer, too.
D. Protects U.S. Interests Through Designation Criteria
U.S. companies and organizations are concerned about several
issues in the Caribbean region, including adherence to
international labor standards, enforcement of intellectual property
rights, and fair payment for expropriated land. The CBTPA is
designed in a manner that allows the United States to use its
leverage to ensure that the Caribbean nations address these issues,
among others. Specifically, the "designation criteria" considered
in determining if a particular nation is eligible to receive
preferential treatment under the CBTPA can be used to pressure
certain Caribbean nations into making local changes that will be
by Stephen Lamar, Dir.of Gov. Relations).
72 Hearing on H.R. 984, supra note 64, at 14 (statement of Hon. Jim Kolbe, Cong.
Representative, Ariz.).
73 Kathleen DesMarteau, TDA Implementation: The Clock Is Ticking, BOBBIN,
Nov. 2000, at 11; see also Jordan Speer, CBI Splashdown, BOBBIN, Nov. 2000, 25-32.
74 DesMarteau, supra note 73, at 13.
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beneficial to the United States.75
1. International Labor Standards
The designation criteria of the CBTPA require that each
Caribbean nation take steps to grant internationally-recognized
worker rights in its country, including the right of association, the
ability to organize and bargain collectively, a prohibition against
any form of forced labor, a minimum age for employment of
children, and acceptable conditions in terms of wages, hours, and
occupational safety and health.76 Upon enacting the CBTPA, the
United States had serious concerns about worker rights in El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. Accordingly, in
order to improve the situation in these nations, the United States
utilized the CBTPA to allow the Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative to conduct initial studies, as well as subject these
countries to ongoing monitoring.77
A recent report by the Government Accounting Office (GAO)
on the worker-rights situation in six major apparel countries in the
Caribbean indicates that while these nations have made significant
efforts to improve worker rights, problems persist.78 In terms of
progress, the GAO study reveals that the Caribbean governments
have (i) reformed their labor laws to meet international standards;
(ii) fortified and simplified procedures to form unions and
negotiate collective bargaining agreements; (iii) established labor
courts; (iv) enhanced labor enforcement and inspection
capabilities of the labor ministries; and (v) increased training and
salaries for labor inspectors.79 In addition to these local
75 U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 4TH REPORT, supra note 3. The criteria for
eligibility under the CBTPA program come from one of three sources: mandatory factors
under the CBERA, discretionary factors under the CBERA, and mandatory factors under
CBTPA to be eligible for the advanced benefits. Id.
76 Trade and Development Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-200, § 211, 114 Stat. 251
(2000).
77 U.S. Dept. of State, Int'l Info. Programs, Fact Sheet: Caribbean Trade
Partnership Act, at http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ar/islands/trade03.htm (Oct. 3, 2000).
78 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CARIBBEAN BASIN: WORKER RIGHTS PROGRESS
MADE, BUT ENFORCEMENT ISSUES REMAIN, at 4 (GAO/NSAID-98-205, July 1998)
[hereinafter WORKER RIGHTS].
79 Id.; see also Press Release, Office of U.S. Trade Representative, U.S. Trade Rep.
Concludes Review of Guatemala's Labor Practices and Trade Preferences under U.S.
Law, at http://www.ustr.gov/releases/2001/05/01-31.pdf (May 31, 2001). Because of
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governmental efforts, the private sector has contributed by
developing various "codes of conduct," which may be adopted by
businesses desirous of projecting a worker-friendly image to their
concerned customers.8  Despite these positive steps, the GAO
report warns that allegations of violations are still commonplace
and the enforcement of labor laws remains problematic.81
Moreover, with regard to the voluntary "codes of conduct," the
study concludes that there is no effective manner of monitoring or
enforcement.82
2. Intellectual Property Rights
The designation criteria for benefits under CBTPA require that
each Caribbean nation provide effective protection of intellectual
property rights.83 Piracy of works protected by copyright is not as
endemic to the Caribbean region as it once was, but problems
persist. For example, according to a recent study by the Office of
the U.S. Trade Representative, widespread incidents of intellectual
property crimes occur in the Bahamas,84 Barbados,85 Costa Rica,86
the Dominican Republic,87 Guatemala,88 and Haiti.89
long-standing concerns about violence against Guatemalan workers, the U.S.
government recently conducted a follow-up investigation in Guatemala. WORKER
RIGHTS, supra note 78. The study identified several "meaningful advances" made by the
Guatemalan government, including (i) enactment of reforms to labor law in May 2001 to
comport with international standards; (ii) strengthening the enforcement authority of the
ministry of labor; (iii) holding significant meetings with members of the International
Labor Organization to identify problems and solutions; and (iv) facilitating the resolution
of a labor dispute involving banana workers, which allowed the re-employment of
approximately 600 workers who were illegally terminated. Id.
80 WORKER RIGHTS, supra note 78, at 5.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Trade and Development Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-200, § 211, 114 Stat. 251
(2000).
84 U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 4TH REPORT, supra note 3, at 20.
85 Id. at 22.
86 Id. at 26.
87 Id. at 29.
88 Id. at 38.
89 Id. at 43.
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3. Expropriation
The designation criteria to the CBTPA also mandate that a
country may not be eligible for benefits if it takes measures that
have the effect of expropriating property owned by U.S. citizens or
companies without prompt and adequate consideration."
Nevertheless, certain incidents involving U.S. interests have
occurred. For example, during the past thirty years "the
government of Costa Rica [has] expropriated large tracts of land
for national parks, biological reserves and indigenous
reservations."91 According to a report by the Office of the U.S.
Trade Representative, "[c]urrent and past governments have made
efforts to resolve several pending expropriation cases involving
U.S. citizens, but the process has been slow and there have been
few successful resolutions."92  While the government of the
Dominican Republic has not expropriated property of U.S. citizens
for several years, it failed to make full payment under exclusive
power purchase agreements with several U.S.-owned independent
energy producers. 93  The Honduran government, similarly, has
been the target of over 150 property and investment disputes
involving U.S. citizens.94 During the Sandinista-era in the mid
1980s, the Nicaraguan government seized homes, farms, bank
accounts and other assets of American citizens. 95 As a result, over
900 American citizens have solicited the assistance of the U.S.
Embassy in Nicaragua regarding more than 2,500 separate
claims.96
Despite the existence of the CBTPA "designation criteria,"
problems in the areas of international labor standards, intellectual
property protections, and expropriations obviously remain.
Caribbean government officials have admitted, though, that by
using preferential duty treatment under CBTPA as an incentive,
the U.S. government has had "substantial leverage" in encouraging
90 Trade and Development Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-200, § 211, 114 Stat. 251
(2000).
91 U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 4TH REPORT, supra note 3, at 27.
92 Id. at 27-28.
93 Id. at 31.
94 Id. at 47.
95 Id. at 52.
96 Id.
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improvements in certain areas.97 If, however, the benefits of the
CBTPA are significantly lessened by the implementation of the
Dye-and-Finish Pledge, Caribbean nations may depend less on the
CBTPA, and thus be less motivated to make changes necessary to
fulfill the designation criteria.
E. Subverts the War on Terrorism
In response to the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center
and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, President Bush declared
a war on terrorism that was designed in large part to deprive all
terrorists of financial resources. Upon signing Executive Order
13,224 Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions with
Persons Who Commit, Threaten or Support Terrorism (the
Executive Order), Bush was unambiguous regarding the intended
effects of this mandate on persons and entities that fail to
collaborate with the United States, including those in Latin
America.98 Bush stated specifically: "[i]f you do business with the
terrorists, if you support them, you will not do business with the
United States of America."99
Although the Executive Order does not identify specific
persons or entities in the Caribbean, this region will nonetheless be
extremely important to the war on terrorism due to the high
incidence of drug trafficking and money laundering, both of which
are inextricably linked to terrorism. With respect to drug
trafficking, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency now uses the term
"narco-terrorism" to describe (i) cultivating, manufacturing,
transporting, or distributing controlled substances; and (ii) taxing,
providing security for, or otherwise aiding or abetting drug
trafficking endeavors in an effort to further or fund terrorist
activities. °0 Despite longstanding efforts by the United States to
97 WORKER RIGHTS, supra note 78, at 9; see also GAO Sees Lax Labor
Enforcement in Trade-Preferred Caribbean Nations, 15 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 31
(Aug. 5, 1998).
98 Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 186 (Sept. 25, 2001).
99 President George W. Bush, Secretary of the Treasury Paul O'Neill, Secretary of
State Colin Powell, Remarks at the White House, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2001/09/20010924-4.html (Sept. 24, 2001).
100 Narco-Terror: The World Wide Connection Between Drugs and Terrorism:
Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism and Gov't Info., U.S.
Senate Committee on the Judiciary (Mar. 13, 2002) (statement of Asa Hutchinson,
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eliminate or minimize narco-terrorism in the Caribbean, recent
studies by the U.S. State Department clearly indicate that nearly
all countries in the region either produce illegal drugs or serve as
major transit points (from Latin America to the United States) for
them. ' 1 Still more distressing is the high degree of infiltration by
several criminal groups in the seven Eastern Caribbean countries
and the potential harmful effects on the U.S.-led war on
terrorism.0 2 According to the State Department study, "[t]errorist
organizations could easily tap into the infrastructure built by
[international drug trafficking organizations] operating in the
region, and may already have done so."' 3 Like narco-terrorism,
money laundering [defined as the process whereby funds derived
from an illicit source (e.g., drug trafficking, terrorism, extortion,
etc.) are disguised through a series of financial transactions at
various institutions] is a severe problem in the Caribbean. For
example, a recent State Department study indicates that the
majority of Caribbean countries are of "concern" or "primary
concern" to the United States in terms of money laundering.0 4
The Bush Administration is acutely aware of the link between
desperate economic circumstances and -terrorism, especially in
Latin America. In fact, one of the purposes of President Bush's
trip in March 2002 to El Salvador, Mexico, and Peru was to re-
focus attention on the region and to develop a strategy to eliminate
terrorism's "breeding. grounds in Latin America's [urban] slums
and impoverished rural areas."'0 5 As, President Bush expressed in
a recent speech before the Inter-American Development Bank,
Adminstrator of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency), at http://judiciary.senate.gov/
hearing.cfm?id=196 [hereinafter Narco-Terror: Hearing].
101 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, INT'L NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT,
at http://www.state.gov/g/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2001/rpt/8479.htm (2001) [hereinafter
NARCOTICS CONTROL REPORT].
102 Id.
103 Id. (emphasis added); see also Narco-Terror: Hearing, supra note 100
(explaining that U.S. spending on international drug control measures reveals that this
country has long been aware of the pervasiveness of the drug trade in Latin America).
104 NARCOTICS CONTROL REPORT, supra note 101, at 33-34. The Caribbean
countries listed include Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Cayman Islands, Dominica,
Dominican Republic, St. Vincent, Aruba, Barbados, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, and Nicaragua. Id.
105 Lewis, supra note 62, at A3.
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while poverty does not directly cause terrorism, persistent
oppression leads to hopelessness." 6 If governments such as those
in Latin America fail to counteract this despondency by meeting
the basic needs of their people, then these areas will become
"havens for terror."' 7 This threat is keenly applicable to Central
America and the Caribbean, a region which has recently been
negatively impacted by civil wars; natural disasters such as
hurricanes and earthquakes; drastically falling market prices for
some of its chief agricultural products like bananas and coffee; and
uncontrollable urban growth.' Other realities harming the
Caribbean economies after the terrorist attacks on September 11,
2001, include drastic drops in revenue from tourism and decreases
in foreign investment due to risk aversion. 10 9  According to
members of the U.S. State Department, when the Caribbean
economies struggle and unemployment rises, a "'shadow'
economy" fueled by the smuggling of drugs, arms, and persons
becomes even stronger in this "critical part of the world's criminal
pipelines."'10
As discussed earlier, many of the Caribbean economies are
heavily dependent on apparel production facilitated by, among
other things, the CBTPA. If the benefits of this trade arrangement
106 Press Release, U.S. White House, President Proposes $5 Billion Dollar Plan to
Help Developing Nations, Remarks by President George W. Bush at the Inter-American
Development Bank, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03 (Mar. 14,
2002) [hereinafter Remarks by President George W. Bush at the Inter-American
Development Bank].
107 Id.; see also Jim Vandehei, In Latin America, Bush Will Focus on Poverty,
Drugs and Terrorism, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 2002, at A24 ("In countries where there are
not good policies, and where there is hopelessness, and where there is poverty, you can
create conditions of the kind that you had in Afghanistan, where the parasites latch on.").
108 David Gonzalez, Central America's Cities Grow Bigger and Poorer, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 17, 2002, at 3. In Central America, nearly seventy-five percent of the
population lives in cities. Id. Those peasants for whom subsistence farming has become
untenable arrive in urban areas only to find more despair. Id. They live in "flimsy
houses on dirty streets that are often ruled by violent youth gangs [and] governments
have failed to provide enough water, sanitation or jobs for the thousands of desperately
poor newcomers." Id.
109 Lino Gutierrez, September 11 and Its Aftermath: The Impact of Doing Business
in the Americas, Remarks before the George Washington University Center for Latin
American Issues, at http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/rm/2001/6706pf.htm (Nov. 27,
2001).
110 Id.
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are partially revoked in accordance with the Dye-and-Finish
Pledge, the local economies will suffer. Hence, given the high
incidence of drug trafficking and money laundering already in the
region, as well as President Bush's unequivocal awareness of the
relationship between poverty and terrorism, modifying U.S. trade
policy such that the Caribbean nations are in jeopardy of becoming
a "haven for terror" is contradictory to the war on terrorism.
F. Undermines a U.S.-Central America Trade Pact
The Bush Administration announced on January 16, 2002, that
the United States plans to "explore" a free trade agreement with
the nations of Central America (i.e., Costa Rica, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua), which already enjoy
preferential duty treatment under the CBTPA.1 ' According to
official sources, the purpose of forming such a trade arrangement
is three-fold: to promote U.S. exports to the region, to support
democracy and economic reform, and to make progress towards
finalizing the FTAA.1 2  More importantly, perhaps,
representatives of the Bush Administration explain that
announcing this potential trade pact at this precise moment is
paramount to reassuring Central American countries that the
United States has not forsaken them.113 In other words, President
Bush desires to clarify that despite the fact that the war on
terrorism has recently become the central point of U.S. foreign
policy, he has not forgotten "the foreign policy commitment he
made last year: A new focus on the Western Hemisphere."'' 14
The Central American leaders reacted enthusiastically to the
possibility of a free trade agreement. For example, only hours
after the announcement, the president of El Salvador appeared on
III President George W. Bush, The Future of the Americas, Remarks at the World
Affairs Councils of America (Jan. 16, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
International Law and Commercial Regulation).
112 Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, U.S. White House, Fact Sheet:
U.S.-Central America Free Trade Agreement, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2002/01/20020116-11.html (Jan. 16, 2002); see also Rossella Brevetti,
United States to Explore FTA with Central America, Bush Says, 19 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) No. 4, 127 (Jan. 24, 2002).
113 David E. Sanger, Bush Declares Free Markets Are Essential for Americas, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 17, 2002, at A19.
114 Id.
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national television, declaring that this potential trade pact with the
United States represented the dawning of a new era." 5 Following
suit, other regional leaders openly supported the initiative; local
newspaper headlines alluded to increased exports, job
opportunities, and foreign investment. Preliminary work began to
arrange a regional presidential summit, that would identify a
common negotiating strategy.' 1 6 When asked the reasons for such
excitement, the Salvadoran Ambassador to the United States
explained that "[i]t is the first time a U.S. president has announced
anything like this. We are taking him at his word and we are
ready." 117
The initial eagerness notwithstanding, the feasibility of
completing the proposed free trade agreement is questionable for
several reasons. First, forming a trade pact with only the Central
American members of the CBTPA nations may prove extremely
divisive in the region. As evidence thereof, Jamaican officials
warned of immediate protests to any such action, and argued that
"even if the Caribbean was later included in an FTAA, giving
Central American countries a competitive edge in the short term
would be devastating to the island nations covered by the
CBTPA.,, 118.
Second, while President Bush consistently touted free trade
during his recent visit to El Salvador, he arrived bearing no
tangible plans in terms of negotiating schedules.1 9 Third, despite
the generalized excitement of Central American leaders for a free
trade agreement, this measure may not enjoy the necessary popular
support due to the regional belief that trade liberalization tends to
115 Marcela Sanchez, The Power of a President's Word, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 2002,
at http://www.washintongpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&node=&contentlD=
A36938-2002Jan25&notFound=true (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
International Law and Commercial Regulation).
116 Id.
117 Id. (emphasis added).
118 Joanna Ramey, The Wait for TPA, WOMEN'S WEAR DAILY, Feb. 12, 2002, at 16.
119 Edwin Chen, Bush Talks Trade in El Salvador, Lauds Democratic Progress,
L.A. TIMES, March 25, 2002, at A3; see also Elisabeth Bumiller, Diplomatic Two-Steps
in Latin America Trip, N.Y. TIMES, March 25, 2002, at A16. Secretary of State, Colin
Powell, announced that the United States would not be "exploring" a free trade
agreement with Central America soon because several other existing trade issues take
precedence. Chen, supra at A3.
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disproportionately benefit the wealthy elites, thereby creating even
larger income disparities.12  Finally, and perhaps most
noteworthy, the Dye-and-Finish Pledge may thwart any possibility
of a free trade pact. As noted above, the Central American nations
contemplated by such a trade agreement with the United States
already benefit from the CBTPA. These countries, however, are
now in jeopardy of having certain existing benefits retracted less
than two years after they were granted. Logic dictates that this
unexpected revocation of benefits will be considered by many in
these Central American countries as a blatant betrayal by the
United States, and the trust upon which the negotiations of the free
trade agreement with Central America were to be based will be
severely diminished, if not destroyed outright."21
G. Safeguards Existing U.S. Investments in Central America
As explained previously, the regulations implementing the
CBTPA provided that the phrase "wholly formed in the United
States" did not require the fabric to be dyed and finished in the
United States in order to qualify for preferential treatment. Based
on this determination, many U.S. companies made "significant
investments" in their partners in the Caribbean region to purchase
equipment for cutting, stonewashing, and dyeing fabrics.122
According to- a recent study by the U.S. International Trade
Commission, allowing these processes to occur in the Caribbean
under the CBTPA has led to (i). improved turnaround time from
order date to delivery; (ii) increased efficiency in apparel logistics;
(iii) creation of many new jobs, including over 10,000 in
Guatemala alone; and (iv) enhanced foreign investment in the
Caribbean garment sector.123
With regard to U.S. investment and job creation, a study
indicates that over forty apparel operations were established in
Guatemala, and Honduras has greatly benefited from sizable
foreign investment in its thirty-six industrial parks dedicated
120 Catherine Elton, Central America Ambivalent Toward Free Trade, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, March 22, 2002, at 7.
121 See id.
122 U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, 15TH REPORT, supra note 4, at 43.
123 Id. As an indicator of size, the government of El Salvador alone reported over
$1.1 million in foreign direct investment in the garment sector in 2000. Id.
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primarily to garment production. 24  In addition to this initial
investment during the first two years of the CBTPA's existence,
based on the "high degree of interest" in the program thus far,
experts predict that it will have a "major impact on growth and
investment" in the Caribbean in the future.
125
If the Dye-and-Finish Pledge is upheld, the millions of dollars
invested by U.S. companies will be essentially lost and the
economies of the Caribbean nations will suffer. Alluding to a
recent visit to the Caribbean by members of the House
Subcommittee on International Trade, Congressman Charles
Rangel explained that "[t]he information ...gathered indicates
that any change to the dye and finish rule will have a direct,
adverse impact on an already ailing Caribbean Basin textile and
apparel industry."'26  This lawmaker argues, in particular, that
partial revocation of preferences will hurt both existing and future
investment in the region.2 7  Agreeing with this position, the
ambassadors of the Caribbean nations sent a letter to the Speaker
of the House, Dennis Hastert, explaining that the proposed Dye-
and-Finish Pledge is extremely untimely since the local apparel
industry has recently been injured by increased competition from
Asian competitors as well as the generalized slowdown in the
world economy after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.128
H. Advances Accomplishments under the CBTPA
Since its introduction in 1983, the Caribbean Basin Economic
Recovery Act (CBERA) has rendered small but positive results for
the Caribbean and the United States alike. According to a recent
report by the U.S. International Trade Commission, this
preferential trade program triggered some foreign direct
investment and economic diversification in the region. 2 9 The
benefits reaped by the Caribbean nations would have been
considerably larger, though, if not for the fact that (i) most goods
124 Id. at 81-85.
125 Id. at 91, 120.
126 Brevetti, supra note 40, at 544-45.
127 Id.
128 See Ambassadors, Rangel Urge Bush to Keep CBI Apparel Benefits, 20 INSIDE
U.S. TRADE 1, 8-9 (Jan. 4, 2002).
129 U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, 15TH REPORT, supra note 4, at xi-xiii.
[Vol. 28
CARIBBEAN BASIN TRADE PARTNERSHIP ACT
eligible under CBERA already entered duty-free under other trade
programs such as the Generalized System of Preferences; and (ii)
goods in which Caribbean nations had a considerable comparative
advantage (e.g., textiles) were excluded under CBERA."3 ° Of
greater relevance perhaps is the fact that Caribbean nations
obtained benefits under CBERA without threatening the U.S.
economy or employment. For example, a recent report by the U.S.
Department of Labor found that "[p]referential tariff treatment
under the CBERA does not appear to have had an adverse impact
on, or have constituted a significant threat to, U.S. employment
generally."' 31  Concurring with this conclusion, a U.S.
International Trade Commission analysis of the twenty leading
imports benefiting exclusively from the CBERA did not uncover
even the minimum amount of U.S. industry displacement (five
percent) to warrant a further investigation.'32
In the aftermath of hurricanes Mitch and Georges in 1998,
which severely damaged the Caribbean, the CBTPA was enacted
with the belief that granting enhanced trade preferences to this
region would effectively promote economic recovery, decrease
illegal immigration, improve regional cooperation efforts to halt
drug trafficking, and foster opportunities for U.S. companies to
establish production-sharing operations in the Caribbean in order
to preserve certain manufacturing operations in the U.S. that
would otherwise be lost. 33  Moreover, expansion of the trade
program vis-d-vis the CBTPA was warranted since this constituted
an "important affirmation of the United States's ongoing
commitment to economic development in the Caribbean Basin."'
34
Apart from official government proclamations, the CBTPA
received support from various U.S. industries, including the
130 Id. at 94.
131 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL LABOR AFFAIRS,
TRADE AND EMPLOYMENT OF THE CARIBBEAN BASIN ECONOMIC RECOVERY ACT, 15TH
ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS PURSUANT TO SECTION 216 OF THE CARIBBEAN BASIN
ECONOMIC RECOVERY ACT, at http://www.dol.gov/dol/ilab/public/programs/oiea/
cb98cong.htm (1999).
132 U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, 15TH REPORT, supra note 4, at 64; see also CBI,
Andean Trade Acts Have Little Effect on U.S. Economy, ITC Report Finds, 15 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) No. 40, 1713 (Oct. 14, 1998).
133 Trade and Development Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-200, 114 Stat. 251 (2000).
134 U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 4TH REPORT, supra note 3, at 1.
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National Cotton Council,'35 the National Retail Federation,"' and
even the U.S. textile industry.'37
Implemented less than two years ago, the CBTPA has already
rendered positive results. For example, according to a recent
report by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, it is clear
that the new CBTPA provisions are being "used extensively," the
value of U.S. imports from the Caribbean have nearly doubled,
and the Caribbean economies have shown signs of
diversification.'38 Just as the CBTPA has positively impacted the
Caribbean, the United States has also benefited by way of:
increased U.S. exports of fabrics, cotton and yam; new business
135 Testimony on H.R. 984, supra note 64, at 83-86 (statement ofF. Ronald Payner,
President, National Cotton Council of America). Since approximately sixty percent of
U.S. cotton is sold annually to the domestic textile industry, representatives of the cotton
industry want both good international trade agreements and a healthy U.S. textile
industry: "[T]he National Cotton Council has been supportive of a Caribbean Basin trade
bill because we believe the right ...bill will enable our industry to compete more
efficiently with low-priced textile imports." Id.
136 Id. at 98-101 (statement of Erik 0. Autor, Vice President, Int'l Trade Counsel,
Nat'l Retail Fed'n). Interested in obtaining inexpensive imports to satisfy cost-sensitive
consumers in the. United States, representatives from this group emphasize the positive
aspects of CBERA enhancement: "In focusing on the likely increase in U.S. imports,
what is often overlooked in the debate over additional trade preferences for [Caribbean]
countries is the growth potential for U.S. exports of yam, fabric, and notions, not to
mention the potential for export growth from U.S. machinery and equipment
manufacturers." Id. at 101.
137, Id. at 88-93. While not relinquishing its argument that dyeing-and-finishing
should be required to occur in the United States, as a matter of self-preservation, this
industry realizes that apparel production in the Caribbean is preferable to that in Asia.
Id. To this effect, the representative stated:
There is clearly a compelling need to extend duty-free treatment immediately to
CBI apparel made from U.S. fabrics and U.S. yams. Failing that, the Caribbean
will lose its competitive edge and the region will be placed in even greater
economic stress. And the U.S. textile industry will face larger and more serious
job losses and even more plant closings in the face of unprecedented price
declines from Asia.
Id. at 93.
138 U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 4TH REPORT, supra note 3, at 1, 11-14. With
regard to economic diversification, the report explains that, although in 1984 the main
exports from the Caribbean were primary goods such as coffee, bananas, and minerals,
under the CBTPA, manufactured goods, such as apparel and machinery, constitute more
than 50 percent of the U.S. imports under the program. Id. at 1; see also Rossella
Brevetti,. USTR Report Says Countries Are Using Expanded CBI Benefits, 19 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) No. 2, 67 (Jan. 10, 2002).
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for U.S. transportation and logistics firms involved in apparel
shipments;13 9 and additional sources of revenue for U.S. port
cities. 4 ° Experts argue that the benefits of CBTPA would have
been even larger if not for the uncertainty caused by the dyeing-
and-finishing controversy and the delay in publishing the final
implementing regulations. 4' Although many industry experts call
the opposition by Senator Jesse Helms baseless, they recognize the
damaging effects for the CBTPA:
so. long as this issue is under public review, important
investments in finishing operations that have been made in the
Caribbean and Central American countries are at risk. And even
more important for the long-term partnerships is the fact that
U.S. companies cannot take the risk of shifting new orders to
beneficiary countries when the rules may change overnight,
possibly even retroactively.
42
In view of the positive results yielded for over two decades by
these trade preference programs for the Caribbean, as well as
predictions of increased benefits in the near future for both the
United States and the Caribbean region under the CBTPA,
impeding the momentum now by implementing the Dye-and-
Finish Pledge appears, to put it lightly, counterproductive.
L Upholds US. Foreign Policy Toward Latin America
The Bush Administration has consistently maintained that
Latin America constitutes an important part of its foreign policy
agenda. According to Otto Reich, Assistant Secretary of State for
Western Hemisphere Affairs, President Bush makes Latin
America and the Caribbean a "high priority" because he "truly
139 Jules Abend, Carriers Eye CB1 Expansion, 42 BOBBIN 3, 52 (Nov. 1, 2000).
140 Congressional Press Release from William J. Jefferson, Representative, House of
Representatives, The Trade & Development Act of 2000, Opportunities for New Orleans
Companies, at http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_-m=la70ea332db33e443957325
e371 1 lb17&docnum=37 (July 7, 2000).
141 Trade Agency Budget Authorizations and Other Customs Issues, Hearing Before
the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means, Subcommittee on
Trade, 107th Cong. 94-95 (July 17, 2001) (testimony of J. Anthony Smith, Central
American and Caribbean Textiles and Apparel Council) [hereinafter Trade Hearings];
seealso Bernal Calls on US to Clarify Provisions in CBTPA, THE GLEANER, July 15,
2001.
142 Trade Hearings, supra note 141, at 88 (testimony of Julia K. Hughes, U.S.
Association of Importers of Textiles and Apparel).
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believes that our future is inextricably tied to that of our
hemispheric neighbors."'43  Other representatives of the Bush
Administration share this opinion, explaining that due to the
growing interdependence between Latin America and the United
States, this region is "at the center of the President's world
view.""' Political rhetoric of this nature notwithstanding,
angering Latin America by implementing the Dye-and-Finish
Pledge would undermine U.S. foreign policy towards the region
and be extremely untimely for a number of reasons.
First, although a temporary shift in political attention towards
Afghanistan and its neighbors is understandable in the aftermath
of the terrorist attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade
Center on September 11, 2001, the United States's neglect of Latin
America since then is beginning to irritate many nations. A
former U.S. diplomat to Latin America confirms that there is
"general disappointment" with the Bush Administration because
of the scant attention that has been given to the region lately. 4
5
Second, along with the annoyance expressed by
representatives of Latin America, respected U.S. trade experts
have pointed out the inconsistencies in the Bush Administration's
trade policy toward Latin America and the world. In the opinion
of a former U.S. Trade Representative, while the Bush
Administration's rhetoric on free trade is abundant, the
corresponding actions are inconsistent. In other words, "the walk
doesn't always follow the talk.', 146  Other policymakers agree,
arguing that amending the CBTPA to implement the Dye-and-
143 Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Otto Reich, U.S.
Foreign Policy in the Western Hemisphere, Remarks Before the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, at http://www.csis.org/americas/reich020313.pdf (Mar. 12, 2002)
(Citing the fact that political and economic instability in Latin America may lead to
increased illegal immigration, drug trafficking, terrorism and social turmoil, Reich
claims that the importance of the region cannot be underestimated: "It is hard to
exaggerated all that we have at stake here.").
144 Acting Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Lino Gutierrez,
Bush Administration Policies for Latin America and the Caribbean, Remarks Before the
Board of Directors of the Pan American Development Foundation, at
http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/rm/2001/4089pf/htm (July 10, 2001).
145 Tim Johnson, Powell: Latin America Important to U.S., MIAMI HERALD, Sept.
10, 2001, at IA.
146 David R. Francis, Why Some U.S. Industries Don't Welcome Freer Trade,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 28, 2002, at 21.
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Finish Pledge will make the United States not only appear "flaky
and unreliable," but also directly contradict the longstanding U.S.
policy of attempting to use trade preferences as a catalyst for
economic development, political stability, and improved working
conditions in some of the poorest countries in the Western
Hemisphere.147
Third, while U.S. efforts are centered elsewhere, many Latin
American countries are experiencing serious problems that may
prove detrimental to the entire hemisphere. For example, because
of a violent coup in April 2002 during which over a dozen persons
were killed and several hundred others were seriously injured,
Hugo Chavez, the former President of Venezuela, was forced to
resign his position.148 Although President Chavez was reinstated
two days later, this event was a sign of the troubled state of
democracy in Latin America, foreshadowing additional coups in
Venezuela,'49 and, an opportunity to question the democratic
principles of the United States. 5 ° Meanwhile, in Peru, the terrorist
group Shining Path appears to be staging a comeback after nearly
a decade of relative inactivity. They detonated car bombs in close
proximity to the U.S. embassy in Lima just prior to President
Bush's recent visit in March 2002, and have issued death threats to
those opposing the reintegration of the group.15" ' Political
volatility, criminal scandals, and an economic crisis in Argentina
threaten to destabilize this country and possibly spread to its
neighbors. Specific examples of the present chaos in Argentina
include: the appointment of five successive presidents during a
two-week period in December 2001; the economic recession that
147 CONSUMERS FOR WORLD TRADE, TEXTILES KIDNAP U.S. TRADE POLICY, at
http://www.cwt.org/news/articles/022202textiles.htm (Feb. 22, 2002).
148 Howard LaFranchi & Phil Gunson, Democracy Shaky in South America,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 16, 2002, at 1 (pointing out that Chavez is the second
South American president to be removed from office in six months).
149 After the Coup, the Reckoning, ECONOMIST,' April 18, 2002, at 35 (warning that
"many successful coups are preceded by botched attempts").
150 See Chavez Redux, ECONOMIST, April 18, 2002, at 12; see also Marc Lisher,
Venezuela's President Chavez Is Ousted in Military Uprising, WALL ST. J., April 12,
2002, at Al.
151 Lucien 0. Chauvin, Rebel Group's Presence Growing Near Peru's Capital,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, April 12, 2002, at 7; see also Car Bomb Near U.S. Embassy in
Peru Kills 9, WASH. TIMES, March 22, 2002, at A15, available at 2002 WL 2907107.
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has devastated the country and triggered widespread social unrest;
and the indictment of former president Carlos Menem and his
aide, Domingo Cavallo, for allegedly approving more than $100
million in illegal arms-sales to Croatia and Ecuador in violation of
international arms embargoes.'52 In Mexico, one of the crucial
components of the local economy, the manufacturing sector based
largely in maquiladoras, continues to struggle in 2002 after
eliminating nearly half-a-million jobs last year.'53 To exacerbate.
the situation, due in part to Mexican President Vicente Fox's
perceived inability to advance projects with the United States
while simultaneously addressing Mexico's internal problems, Fox
has lost congressional support to proceed with certain U.S.-
Mexico initiatives.'54 In Colombia, the national government, the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, and the United Self-
Defense Forces of Colombia are engaged in a bloody guerilla war
that entails conventional attacks, multiple bombings, mass killings,
and kidnappings.' 55  Regional stability is threatened by the
widespread violence and the Colombian rebels' proven
involvement in drug trafficking and international terrorism.'56
Finally, although no major event has occurred there recently,
experts explain that Central America is "stuck in poverty,
corruption, and an uphill experiment in democracy."'57
152 Larry Rohter, Argentina's Former Economic Chief Indicted in 90's Arms Sales,
N.Y. TIMES, April 11, 2002, at A17; Colin Barraclough, Argentines Look for New
Leaders, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, April 5, 2002, at 1.
153 Graham Gori, Latest Data Dampens Mexico's Hopes, N.Y. TIMES, April 12,
2002, at W1 (warning that this continued decrease in industrial production may "spell
political trouble" for Fox, whose campaign promises included a sizable increase in
employment opportunities).
154 See Traci Carl, Mexican Senate Denies Fox's Trip, ASSOCIATED PRESS
NEWSWIRES, April 10, 2002, at 2002 WL 18181725. Mexican law dictates that the
Senate must authorize any presidential trips outside the country. Id. Dissatisfied with
Fox's "coziness with the United States," Fox's policy toward Cuba, and Fox's perceived
unwillingness to deal effectively with local problems, the Mexican Senate recently
refused to allow Fox to travel to the United States and Canada. Id.
155 See, e.g., Mary Anastasia O'Grady, Columbia's New Leader Will Face a War on
Two Fronts, WALL ST. J., May 24, 2002, at A13.
156 See, e.g., Ken Guggenheim, Colombian Instability Concerns GOP, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, April 11, 2002, at 2002 WL 18182465; Susannah A. Nesmith, Rebels Kidnap
Lawmakers in Colombia, ASSOCIATED PRESS, April 12, 2002, at 2002 WL 18182737;
Scott Wilson, Colombia's Hit-And-Run War, WASH. POST, March 27, 2002, at A 12.
157 See Alfredo Corchado, As Latin American Simmers, Bush Says U.S. to Renew
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The fourth reason that further damaging Caribbean nations by
implementing the Dye-and-Finish Pledge would be unadvisable is
that foreign investment in the region is declining at an alarming
rate. While the Bush Administration persists in espousing the
benefits of open markets, free trade, and cross-border investment
in Latin America, most prominent American brokerage firms do
not appear to heed the message. On the contrary, because of the
dreadful financial situation in Argentina and Venezuela and the
overall unappealing nature of emerging-market investments, the
majority of reputable investment organizations have recently
removed their most influential Latin American strategists and
reduced their research and sales operations.158
Fifth, as a result of the economic recession, triggered in part by
the terrorist attacks of September 2001, many Latin American
nations, including those in the Caribbean, have suffered
significantly due to a drastic decrease in tourism, a slowdown in
foreign investment, and diminishing U.S. demand for many items
produced in the region.159 The immediate result will be an
increase in generalized poverty, which may transform itself into
widespread social discontent that permits local leaders to
capitalize by reintroducing increased state intervention or even
authoritarian regimes. 6 ° Along with the problems sparked by the
U.S. economic recession, Latin America finds itself in a precarious
situation due to: increasing foreign competition in the area of
apparel; an appreciable drop in the value of traditional exports
from the region, such as coffee and bananas; and recent natural
disasters, which have devastated the local economies and killed
Focus, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 17, 2002, at 6A. Frustrated with the Bush
Administration's inaction toward Latin America, experts on the region sarcastically ask:
"Do we need a meteorite to hit the continent before we pay attention? Do we need the
Chinese to invade? Any one of these countries are powder kegs that can explode at any
moment." Id.
158 Anthony DePalma, Wall Street's Latin Spotlight Dims, N.Y. TIMES, March 31,
2002, at 6. Brokerage firms that have introduced such "major strategic shifts" include
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs and Lehman Brothers. Id.
159 Times Have Changed, LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIC POLICIES (Inter-American
Development Bank, Washington, D.C.), 4th Quarter, Vol. 16, 2001, at 7.
160 Clouds on the Latin American Horizan, LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIC POLICIES
(Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, D.C.), 4th Quarter, Vol. 16, 2001, at
2.
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thousands of people.'61
The growing pessimism regarding the future of Latin America,
both within the region and abroad, is the sixth reason that the Dye-
and-Finish Pledge is imprudent. Approximately a decade ago,
Latin America was in good stead: dictatorships disappeared;
optimism reigned; and the region embraced free-market theories,
liberalized trade, and democracy. 62 Now, "the mood could hardly
be more different" due to, among other things, widespread
economic recession, an increasing dissatisfaction with democracy,
massive migration from the region to the United States and
Europe, political unrest in Argentina, and violence in Colombia. 1
63
What's worse, many developed countries have not freed their
markets for Latin America's exports.164 This loss of faith in Latin
America is also common in the United States. The comment of
one journalist who covers this region is representative of the
attitude that has begun to pervade the U.S.:
For all its struggles, Latin America seems to be getting nowhere
fast. After years of sacrifice, its people are still awaiting the
payoffs of reform, and the promised bright future that never
quite seems to arrive. To paraphrase an old Brazilian saying, it
is the region of the future, and unfortunately it sometimes looks
like it always will be. 165
Finally, effectuating the Dye-and-Finish Pledge seems
extremely unwise due to President Bush's relative ineffectiveness
during his March 2002 trip to several Latin American nations.
Before his departure, U.S. government officials characterized the
upcoming trip as a "'concrete manifestation'' of the Bush
Administration to the region. 66  Despite these grandiose
pronouncements, apart from a considerable amount of talk about
"amigos" and abundant photo opportunities, little was truly
161 Matthew Estevez, Brass Ring, LATIN TRADE, Dec. 1, 2001, at 42, available at
2001 WL 8667582 (arguing "there's too much invested in the region for the United
States to turn back now").
162 Is Latin America Losing its Way?, ECONOMIST, Mar. 2, 2002, at 11.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Laurie Goering, The Future Is Bright and Always Just Ahead," CHI. TRIB., Jan.
20, 2002, § 2 (Perspectives), at 3.
166 Rossella Brevetti, Bush to Discuss Central American FTA In Upcoming Trip to
El Salvador, Reich Says, 19 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 11,463 (Mar. 14, 2002).
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accomplished during the brief mission. For example, concrete
plans for migration reform with Mexico were not achieved,
President Bush was unable to deliver an approved Andean Trade
Preference Act to Peru, no official start date for negotiations of the
proposed U.S.-Central America Free Trade Agreement was given,
and U.S. representatives hardly mentioned potential solutions for
the economic turmoil in Argentina. 167 Consequently, many Latin
American leaders now claim that President Bush has failed them
by not fulfilling his fundamental commitment of always "looking
south."'
168
J. Protects the Bush Administration's Reputation As a Free
Trader
In addition to repeatedly classifying himself as a political
leader focused on Latin America, President Bush, during both his
presidential campaign and his time in office, has claimed to be a
devout free-trader. 169 Recently, however, the Bush Administration
has taken several measures designed to protect certain U.S.
industries from outside competition. For example, under
enormous pressure from domestic businesses and lawmakers, in
March 2002, President Bush imposed significant tariffs on U.S.
imports of certain steel and lumber products. 7 ' Likewise, in his
zeal to obtain approval of TPA in the U.S. House of
Representatives, President Bush has openly supported the Dye-
and-Finish Pledge made in December 2001.171 In an attempt to
explain the apparent contradiction between these actions and
Bush's constant rhetoric in support of free trade, the U.S. Trade
Representative argues that promoting free trade requires the Bush
Administration to address the "home front" and "international
167 Frustrated, ECONOMIST, March 30, 2002, at 32.
168 See Tony Smith, Latin Americans Say Bush Failed Them, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
March 24, 2002, available at 2002 WL 17187756.
169 THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, PRESIDENT'S 2001 INTERNATIONAL
TRADE AGENDA, H.R. Doc. No. 107-69, at 1-8, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2001/05/20010511 .html (May 10, 2001).
170 See Peter Menyasz, Resolving Softwood Lumber Dispute Top Canadian Trade
Priority in 2002, 19 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 16, 716 (Apr. 18, 2002) (discussing the
softwood lumber dispute between the U.S. and Canada).
171 Rugaber, supra note 34, at 2017.
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front" simultaneously.' With regard to the former, the trade
official explained: "the only way we could get support from the
American people for open markets and trade is to use our domestic
laws and our international laws to the fullest."' 73
In spite of such efforts to justify the recent protectionist
maneuvers, these actions have ignited criticisms of the Bush
Administration's trade policy from many sources. Commentators
have warned, for instance, that a U.S. President that tends to
placate protectionists and influential domestic industries will be
unable to lead the Western Hemisphere to "open markets, security,
and strong democracy."' 74 In short, "[e]ither Mr. Bush will lead
on trade or Latin America will flounder."'75  Other experts,
irritated with the Bush Administration's apparent capitulation to
powerful domestic industries, warn that Bush is in jeopardy of
making a mockery of himself as a friend of free trade; with a
nearly record-setting public approval rating of approximately
eighty percent, they argue, President Bush should be in good stead
to confront a clear-cut test: "He can take the politically expedient
route or he can stand up for the cause he claims to believe in."' 76
Expanding on this position, other policy analysts assert that the
recent protectionist measures involving steel, lumber and textiles
have created "a schizophrenic trade policy" that may anger U.S.
trading partners and lead to a trade war that would damage U.S.
companies and consumers because of higher prices for imported
products, shortages of important items, and shrinking markets for
U.S. exports."' Perhaps of greater significance, protecting U.S.
172 Id.
173 Rossella Brevetti & Nancy Ognanovich, Bush Announces Safeguard Tariffs As
High as 30 Percent on Some Steel, 19 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 390, 392 (Mar. 7,
2002).
174 Mary Anastia O'Grady, Otto Reich Tackles a Big Repair Job, Hemisphere
Policy, WALL ST. J., Mar. 1, 2002, at A15.
175 Id.
176 Bob Zoellick's Grand Strategy, ECONOMIST, Mar. 2, 2002, at 35; see also
Tangled Up In Textiles, ECONOMIST, Mar. 30, 2002, at 25-26 (explaining that the recent
decision to impose tariffs on steel and lumber have already called the Bush
Administration's dedication to free trade into question, and further protectionism for
textiles may expose the free-trade fagade as a "complete fraud.").
177 Richard S. Dunham, A High-Risk, Two-Faced Trade Policy, Bus. WK., Mar. 25,
2002.
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markets may have relinquished the Bush Administration's "moral
authority to preach free trade around the world," especially during
the upcoming round of negotiations of the World Trade
Organization.178
In light of the pervasive skepticism (both in Latin America and
the United States) regarding the validity of the Bush
Administration's free trade agenda and the obstacles that this
attitude may present in future trade initiatives, further weakening
the nation's alleged affinity for open markets by implementing the
Dye-and-Finish Pledge seems ill-advised.
K. Strengthens U.S. National Security
One of the major findings upon enacting the CBTPA was that
expansion of this trade program to include, among other things,
apparel manufacturing would serve to enhance U.S. national
security by promoting legitimate economic opportunities in the
Caribbean region.79 Arguing in support of this bill, certain U.S.
lawmakers explained that it is "critical" to American security that
persons in the Caribbean have abundant opportunities in the legal
economy so that they are not obligated to resort to drug trafficking
or illegal migration to feed their families.18 ° Caribbean officials
also agree that apparel assembly, an industry that employs
hundreds of thousands of persons and constitutes the region's
third-largest source of income behind tourism and remittances, is
absolutely fundamental to the well-being of both the Caribbean
and the United States. According to the Dominican Ambassador
to the United States, "[m]ore jobs means more political stability
and a better climate for U.S. investments and tourism .... U.S.
security objectives with respect to its southern neighbors would
thus be strengthened."'81 From this perspective, then, preserving
178 Neil King Jr., & Michael Phillips, Bush's Wagering on Steel Tariffs Fails to Win
New Trade Openings, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 2002.
179 Trade and Development Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-200, § 202(a)(7), 114 Stat.
251 (2000).
180 Caribbean and Central American Relief and Economic Stabilization Act:
Hearing on H.R. 434 before the Subcommittee on Trade, House Committee on Ways and
Means, 106th Cong. (Mar. 23, 1999) (statement of Senator Bob Graham) [hereinafter
Hearing on H.R. 434].
181 Hearing on H.R. 434, supra note 180 (testimony of Berardo Vega, Dominican
Republic Ambassador to the United States).
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the CBTPA is by no means a gesture of good will; rather, it is a
self-interested policy decision designed to protect U.S. national
security. Champions of this type of preferential trade program
describe the benefits for the United States in broad terms,
explaining that "[u]ltimately, we - as a nation - stand to lose or
gain, depending on the economic health of our hemispheric
neighbors. A more aggressive trade policy in the hemisphere is
not only important for increasing markets for U.S. companies, but
it also enhances stability and promotes security in the
hemisphere."'18 2 Thwarting the capacity of Caribbean nations to
develop legitimate economies by revoking the CBTPA at a time
when a guerilla war is being waged directly to the south in drug-
laden Colombia, and the United States's enhancement of security
measures to fortify its borders against terrorist-affiliated
immigrants would imperil U.S. national security.
L. Undermines Recent United Nations Efforts for the Poor
President Bush has acknowledged the link between poverty
and terrorism, stating that the dire economic straits in Latin
America make people vulnerable to outside influences and can
convert this region into a "haven for terrorists." '183 The leaders of
poor nations clearly share this position, but warn the developed
nations that "if they want a world free of terrorism, they will need
to pay for it."' 84 With this in mind, in March 2002, President Bush
attended the United Nations Development Summit in Monterrey,
Mexico, at which he announced that the United States would
increase its aid to eradicate poverty by fifty percent over the next
three years, reaching $15 million.185 A portion of this money will
undoubtedly be directed toward the Caribbean, a region
characterized by varying degrees of poverty and
underdevelopment. While the increased U.S. aid to eliminate
182 147 Cong. Rec. S2227 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 2001) (statement of Senator DeWine)
(emphasis added).
183 Remarks by President George W. Bush at the Inter-American Development
Bank, supra note 106.
184 Julie Watson, Poor Nations Warn Rich on Terror, ASSOCIATED PRESS, March 22,
2002; Brendan M. Case, UN. Leaders Link Poverty, Terrorism, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, March 22, 2002.
185 Pete Engardio, A Down Payment in the War on Poverty, Bus. WK., Mar. 20,
2002.
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poverty is laudable, it may be counteracted by the Dye-and-Finish
Pledge supported by the Bush Administration. Simply stated, the
Bush Administration's support of this trade measure "risks
canceling out much of the potential good that its aid will do. After
all, what is the point of helping a poor... country to set up export
business if you do not allow its products into your country?" '1 86
M Identifies the True Sources of the U.S. Textile Crisis
Implementation of the Dye-and-Finish Pledge represents bad
policy because doing so will have little effect on saving already
troubled U.S. textile businesses, while significantly damaging the
Caribbean nations that depend to such a large extent on the
apparel-related provisions of the CBTPA for their economic
survival. Stated differently, the certain damage to the Caribbean
overshadows any speculative benefits to the affected domestic
industry. Losing approximately 700,000 jobs since 1994, the U.S.
textile industry consistently (and perhaps correctly) claims that it
is in a "state of crisis."' 87 This grave situation, the textile industry
argues, is attributable in part to preferential treatment programs
such as the CBTPA.188  The validity of this argument is
questionable, however, for several reasons. First, establishing a
causal nexus between trade initiatives such as the CBTPA and the
demise of the U.S. textile industry is quite difficult because a
186 What the President Giveth. .. , ECONOMIST, March 28, 2002.
187 CONGRESSIONAL TEXTILE CAUCUS, REMARKS OF CHUCK HAYES, President,
American Textile Manufacturers Institute, before the Congressional Textile Caucus
(June 16, 2001); Press Release, American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Charels A.
Hayes, Guilford Mills, Inc., President of the American Textile Manufacturers Institute,
statement following today's approval of the Andean Trade Expansion Bill by the U.S.
House of Representatives (Nov. 16, 2001); Letter from the Members of the Textile
Caucus to President George W. Bush (August 2, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation.); Press Release, American
Textile Manufacturers Institute, Textile Industry Year-End Trade and Economic Report
(Jan. 2, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and
Commercial Regulation); OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST AND THE INT'L TRADE
DIVISION OF THE AMERICAN TEXTILE MANFUCTERES INSTITUTE, CRISIS IN U.S. TEXTILES:
THE IMPACT OF THE ASIAN CURRENCY DEVAULATIONS AND THE U.S. GOV'T ACTIONS
URGENTLY NEEDED TO REBALANCE THE COMPETITVE SITUATION (Aug. 2001) (copy on
file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation)
[hereinafter CRISIS IN U.S. TEXTILES].
188 Will Pinkston, Burlington Industries Plans to Cut Up to 4,000 Jobs in
Restructuring, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 2002.
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myriad of factors have played a role. Among the contributing
factors to the downfall of the U.S. textile industry are: unwise
business decisions made by certain American textile entities,
189
increased technology and mechanization that has decreased the
need for employees; the overall weakened economy experienced
in the United States recently; 9° the failure of U.S. firms to prepare
themselves for stiffer foreign competition by developing
production-sharing arrangements in Latin 1America;91 the Asian
currency devaluations and strong U.S. dollar that together caused
artificially-low-priced textiles to flood the U.S. market; and the
increasing incidence of customs fraud whereby Asian textiles and
apparel goods are shipped through Mexico to fraudulently receive
preferential treatment under NAFTA. 192  Second, the textile
industry's "crisis" argument is also discounted when one realizes
that the U.S. government has already put into place a "social
safety net" to help those domestic textile workers hurt by trade
arrangements such as the CBTPA. In particular,, the trade
adjustment assistance program (TAA) allows those workers
displaced due to the CBTPA to obtain money for necessary
relocations and job-skills training, wage insurance to compensate
for any loss of salary, incurred at a new position, and health
189 147 Cong. Rec. H8299 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 2001). This lawmaker argues that, in
the case of Burlington Industries, Inc., a major textile company located in North Carolina
that recently declared bankruptcy, the cause of its demise was not an influx of foreign
imports. Id. Rather, troubles resulted mainly from a focus on protecting itself against a
hostile takeover bid and, ironically enough, a large investment in Mexico to build a new
plant to take advantage of preferential textile treatment under NAFTA. Id.
190 Pinkston, supra note 188. Instead of taking personal responsibility for the events
that forced Burlington to recently lay off approximately 4,000 workers amid its corporate
reorganization, the CEO of the company argued that the cuts were due mainly to U.S.
trade policy since "the U.S. government unfairly allows into the country a flood of
imports subsidized by foreign governments while not doing enough to police goods
entering illegally." Id.
191 Dan Morse, Unraveling Under Pressure of Debt, Imports, U.S. Textile Makers
Also Face End of Quotas, WALL ST. J., Dec. 27, 2001. In the opinion of this author,
although U.S. textile firms say that they are facing the worst economic crisis since the
Great Depression, they have failed to prepare themselves by solidifying duty-free
partnerships with factories in Latin America. Id. Instead, these companies are focused
on surviving by fending off creditors, closing factories, and simply waiting until the U.S.
economy improves. Id.
192 CRISIS IN U.S. TEXTILES, supra note 187, at Part 2.
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insurance.' Third, blaming the CBTPA for the woes of the U.S.
textile industry is tenuous since it is merely one of numerous
programs by which foreign apparel products are granted
preferential access to the U.S. market.1 94 Finally, the crisis claim
and attendant request for trade protectionism may be suspect in
light of the comments by Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the U.S.
Federal Reserve, regarding the inevitability and benefits of foreign
competition. According to Greenspan, interfering with foreign
competition by placing barriers to imports will prevent U.S
markets and others from deploying capital appropriately; that is, to
the most cost-effective production of goods and services that are
most highly valued by consumers. 95 Instead of expending more
efforts on protecting domestic industries (such as textiles), argues
this preeminent economist, the focus should be on job-skills
enhancement and retraining. 96
V. CONCLUSION
Although the preliminary results from the CBERA were not
spectacular, this trade program proved mutually beneficial to the
Caribbean and the United States. Congressional support for this
Caribbean initiative was such that, when Mexico was placed in an
advantageous position because of the passage of NAFTA, the
CBTPA was introduced in 2000 to expand duty preferences to,
among other things, certain textile and apparel goods from the
Caribbean.
As expected, the CBTPA has yielded small yet positive results
despite numerous (and initially unsuccessful) efforts to derail this
program in the name of protecting certain domestic industries.
193 See Deborah Billings, DOL Statistics Show Significant Jump in Estimates of Job
Losses Related to Trade, 19 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 8, 309 (Feb. 21, 2002) (trade
adjustment assistance information); Fawn H. Johnson, House Approves Bill to
Reauthorize Trade Adjustment Assistance Plans for Workers, 18 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
No. 49, 1984 (Dec. 13, 2001); Senate Democrats Take Hardline on TAA-Health Care
Debate, 20 INSIDE U.S. TRADE 11, 35-36 (Mar, 15, 2002).
194 147 Cong. Rec. H8292 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 2001) (statement of Representative
Watt).
195 International Trade and the American Economy: Hearing Before the U.S. Senate
Committee on Finance, April 4, 2001, at 5 (statement of Dr. Alan Greenspan, Chairman
of the Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System) (asserting that "[p]rotectionism will
also slow the inevitable transition of the workforce to more productive endeavors.").
196 Id. at 6.
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More importantly, recent reports by several governmental agencies
predict that, barring any alteration to the CBTPA, this program
will generate increased benefits for the Caribbean and the United
States in the near future. Through sheer persistence and
opportunism, however, the U.S. textile industry has now managed
to unravel the CBTPA with the Dye-and-Finish Pledge.
This partial revocation of the CBTPA is designed to
temporarily protect the 440,000 textile-related jobs that currently
exist in the United States. In doing so, however, many negative
effects will be triggered: passage of the FTAA will be frustrated,
foreign investment and production-sharing arrangements will shift
from the Caribbean to Mexico, the Western Hemisphere will be
unable to prepare itself for the flood of Asian textiles in 2005,
protection of international labor standards and property rights in
the Caribbean will deteriorate, the war on terrorism will be
undermined, the potential U.S.-Central America Free Trade
Agreement will be jeopardized, existing U.S. investments in the
Caribbean will diminish in value, the Bush Administration's
reputation as an advocate for both Latin America and free trade
will be weakened, and advancement under the CBTPA will be
essentially stymied.
To make matters worse, in light of the multiplicity of factors
that conspired to imperil the U.S. textile industry and the
inevitability of increasing foreign competition, limiting the
CBTPA alone will likely have a negligible effect on remedying the
situation. Establishing certain safeguards for vulnerable domestic
industries is undoubtedly an important element of any cohesive
trade policy. Introducing drastic measures (especially through
legislative maneuvering) that cause numerous hemispheric injuries
while generating relatively few domestic benefits, however, is
injudicious. 197
197 Trade Off, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 24, 2001, available at
http://www.thenewrepublic.com By opposing free trade, certain politicians are basically
conveying the message that
they value the jobs of a comparatively tiny number of politically
influential workers in a handful of industries and regions over the
good of the entire population. Or, put differently, that they'd prefer
to lavish benefits on a small, exclusive minority at the expense of the
vast majority of Americans. They had better hope that the vast
majority of Americans aren't paying attention. Id.
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